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ABSTRACT: “What is truth?” Pilot asked Jesus of
Nazareth. For many in academe today this question seems
quaintly passé. Rejection of “truth” goes hand-in-hand with
the rejection of epistemological realism. Educational thought
over the last decade has instead been dominated by antirealist, instrumentalist ideas of two types: first by
psychological constructivism and later by social
constructivism. Social constructivism subsequently has been
pressed to its logical conclusion in the form of relativistic
multiculturalism. Proponents of both psychological
constructivism and social constructivism value knowledge
for its utility and eschew as irrelevant speculation any notion
that knowledge is actually about reality. The arguments are
largely grounded in the discourse of science and science
education where science is “western” science; neither
universal nor about what is really real. The authors defended
the notion of science as universal in a previous article. The
present purpose is to offer a commonsense argument in
defense of critical realism and the epistemically and
ontologically distinguished position of science (rather than
privileged) within a framework of epistemological pluralism.
The paper begins with a brief cultural survey of events
during the thirty-year period from 1960-1990 that brought
many educators to break with realism and concludes with
comments on the pedagogical importance of realism.
Understanding the cultural milieu of the past forty years is
critical to understanding why traditional philosophical
attacks on social constructivist ideas have proved impotent
defenders of scientific realism.

The good Dr. Johnson and James Boswell
were walking down a London street one day
discussing George Berkeley's philosophy of
immaterialism. Dr. Johnson, unconvinced
by Berkeley's logic, said to Boswell, "I
refute it thus!" Upon which he turned and
soundly kicked the street curb with his big
toe – much to Boswell's amusement!

Along with Boswell, one is amused. Of course,
Samuel Johnson's refutation of immaterialism was
no philosophical threat to Berkeley. What Johnson
did was to present dramatically the wisdom of
common folk and everyday, ordinary life. For
most people philosophy is an esoteric, arcane
discipline with little apparent practical value.
Unfortunately, that is not always a wise view. For
example, Duschl (1985) argued that for 25 years
science curriculum developers ignored concurrent
development in the philosophy of science,
resulting in impoverished curricula. In the years
since Duschl’s article there has been much more
interest in both the history and philosophy of
science as these fields pertain to education.
Indeed, educational thought over the last decade
has been dominated by instrumentalist philosophy
of two types: first by psychological constructivism
and later by social constructivism. Social
constructivism has been pressed to its logical
conclusion in the form of relativistic (i.e.,
philosophical) multiculturalism. Proponents of
both psychological constructivism and social
constructivism value knowledge for its utility and
eschew any notion that knowledge is actually
about reality as irrelevant speculation, thus the
label instrumentalism. The arguments are largely
grounded in the discourse of science and science
education where science is “western” science;
neither universal nor about what is really real. We
have defended the notion of science as universal
in a previous article (Cobern & Loving, 2001). In
this paper, our purpose is to offer a commonsense
argument in defense of critical realism. The paper
begins with a brief cultural survey of events
during the thirty-year period from 1960-1990 that
brought many educators to break with realism and
concludes with comments on the pedagogical
1
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importance of realism. Understanding the cultural
milieu of the past forty years is critical to
understanding why traditional philosophical
attacks (e.g., Slezak, 1994 a&b; Suchting, 1992 &
1995) and ideological attacks (e.g., Gross, Levitt,
& Lewis, 1996) on social constructivist ideas have
proved impotent defenders of scientific realism for
most educators including science educators.
From Where We Have Come
The National Science Foundation (USA) funded
major science education curriculum reforms from
the late 1950s through the late 1960s. Garrison &
Bentley (1990, p. 188) called this decade the
“golden era” of North American and European
science education curriculum development.
Prather (1990, p. 12) called the events of the
1960s a "revolution in science education." A mere
two decades after this “golden era” for science
education, however, one finds that the USA and
other nations were once again agonizing over the
inadequacies of school science (Duschl, 1985).
Mallinson (1984, p. 2) wrote of the ironic déjà vu
– that criticisms of the 1980s were “little more
than plagiarism of statements that appeared in the
literature of the 1950s and 1960s.” According to
Duschl, “Mallinson’s irony” could in part be
attributed to the philosophical and historical
datedness of the science curriculum reformers.
The point being made is that during the
same period of time (1956-1966) in which
various science contents were being
revised and rewritten by scientists to
produce curricula which would instruct
students on how to operate and think like a
scientist; the prevailing ideas among
historians and philosophers of science
about the nature of scientific inquiry were
being challenged and changed. (Duschl,
1985, p. 548)
Nadeau & Desautels (1984, p. 7-8) concur:
Numerous studies in recent years have
shown that science teaching has not
achieved the objectives set for it some
twenty years ago when, under American
influence, the most extensive renewal ever
undertaken in science education was
2

begun. It is almost universally agreed that
this endeavor was a failure.
They go on to argue that by “by giving insufficient
thought and attention to the nature of scientific
knowledge and the conditions under which it has
been developed, science teaching reinforces
beliefs and myths that are inherent in scientistic
ideology (Nadeau & Désautels, 1984, p. 8). They
argued that school science promoted the “myth of
scientism.” This myth includes:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Scientism: scientific knowledge deserves
unquestioned epistemic privilege.
Naive realism: scientific knowledge is about
the way things really are.
Naive empiricism: “the human mind as a
tabula rosa on which knowledge is recorded
item by item” (p. 24).
Naive verificationism: scientific knowledge is
developed via inductive processes.
Objectivism: the scientist is a completely
disinterested, objective participant in scientific
endeavors.
Excessive rationalism: “The conquest of truth
is viewed as a cumulative and consequently
continuous process that has gone on,
uninterrupted by precipitate change or sudden
alteration, since the days of Babylon” (p. 48).

This Mallinson-Duschl-Nadeau/Désautels analysis
was by most accounts correct. The early NSF
curricular efforts leaned too uncritically on a
colloquial version of positivism (Cobern, 1997) at
a time that logical positivism had lost almost all its
traction amongst philosophers and historians of
science.
It would, however, be incorrect to assume
that the 1960s NSF science education curriculum
reforms lacked any innovation. Reminiscent of
Duschl’s 1985 title, DeBoer (1991, p. 164) claims
that in the twenty years preceding the NSF reform
efforts, “science teaching had not kept pace” with
new conceptions of science as described by
Jerome Bruner and Joseph Schwab. Theirs was not
like the inductivist-realist philosophy of science.
That received view was “characterized by an
urgent desire for ‘objectivity’, empiricism and
elimination of metaphysics” (Elkana, 2000, p.
463) and,
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the tradition in science teaching was to
feed the student with huge amounts of
information about ‘objective’ facts, and
‘proved’ laws of nature, and after the law
had been memorized, the teacher
performed a demonstration in class…
[that] served as an experimental
confirmation… (Elkana, 2000, p. 465)
Bruner (1960), in contrast, saw science textbooks
as little more than collections of facts and ideas.
He was concerned about the structure of science
textbooks and science curriculum. He observed
that science textbooks and curricula did not reflect
the structures of scientific disciplines at a time
when increasing importance was being attributed
to the structures of disciplines. Bruner argued that:
Grasping the structure of the subject is
understanding it in a way that permits
many other things to be related to it
meaningfully. To learn structure, in short,
is to learn how things are related. (Bruner,
1960, p. 7)
Similarly, Schwab (1962, p. 24) complained that
school science was taught “as a nearly unmitigated
rhetoric of conclusions in which the current and
temporary constructions of scientific knowledge
are conveyed as empirical, literal, and irrevocable
truths.” He went on to argue that the methods and
processes of doing science were missing in current
science textbooks and curricula. Hence, the
fluidity of science was missing. The 1960s science
curricula funded by the National Science
Foundation were innovative in that they were
attempts to reflect the structure of various
scientific disciplines and to present science as
inquiry rather than as the rhetoric of conclusions,
to use Schwab's phrase.
What we see from the Mallinson-DuschlNadeau/Désautels analyses of the mid 1980s is
that the structure of disciplines and inquiry
concepts promoted by Bruner and Schwab
represented a positivist-instrumentalist view of
scientific knowledge that emphasized method:
the one and only true method of science is
the method of empiricism, of mathematical
positivism, and… the elimination of

metaphysics…. science develops by
empirical refutation of old theories, by
objective formulation of ‘critical
experiments’ and by empirical decision, as
to which of the alternative theories is the
better predicting instrument. (Elkana,
2000, p. 470)
Despite contrary philosophical views raised by
Hanson (1958), Kuhn (1962) and Toulmin (1960)
the positivist-instrumentalist view of science was
strongly supported in the science community. In
education this view mainly served to support the
interests of the science community1 that there be
an adequate educational pipeline delivering future
scientists (Cobern, 1996 & 1997). This is of little
surprise given that a major stimulus for 1960s
science curriculum reform effort was the Sputnik
scare and the challenge of keeping scientific and
technological pace with the Soviet Union.
Regarding the lay citizenry, however, the
reformers of the period simply assumed that
“science would be inherently interesting to all
students if it were presented in the way it is known
to scientists” (Hofstein & Yager, 1982, p. 542).
From the beginning, critics of the NSF
sponsored curriculum reforms argued that “the
need was for an enlightened citizenry, not an
educational elite” (DeBoer, 1991, p. 173).
Gradually, Paul DeHart Hurd’s (1998) notion of
public science literacy or public scientific literacy
took root. From the 1970s on there was a new
progressivism in science education that spawned a
series of science curriculum efforts that were more
student-, socially-, and culturally-oriented. This
was a remarkable educational shift from science
education serving the interests of science to
serving the public interest in science. DeBoer
(1991) reminds us that during the 1920s, 1930s
and 1940s the control of science curricula was in
the hands of professional educators rather than
scientists, prompting Joseph Schwab to complain
that professional educators paid more attention to
social needs than to subject matter. But, under the
guidance of Schwab and Bruner that situation was
reversed during the NSF-curriculum dominated
1960s; only to have the curriculum focus reversed
yet again during the 1980s. One must agree with
the Preacher: “The thing that hath been, it is that
1

For an excellent discussion of the difference between the interests of
science and interest in science, see Eger (1989).
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which shall be; and that which is done is that
which shall be done: and there is no new thing
under the sun” (Ecclesiastes 1:9).
The Challenges to Authority
In the 1980s, the pendulum of science curriculum
reform swung away from the subject-centered,
structure-of-disciplines approach to school
science. The proposed solution for the most recent
“crisis in science education” was “to offer science
that could help people in their everyday lives, that
would allow them to make a contribution to the
well-being of society, and that was interesting to
students” (DeBoer, 1991, p. 198). These efforts
included Science-Technology-Society programs,
humanistic approaches to science education,
values education approaches to science education,
environmental education, and programs that use
social issues to structure science education.
According to DeBoer, Hofstein and Yager (1982)
championed the use of social issues to structure
science education arguing that the goals for
science education must change to meet the current
needs of society. The need in the 1980s was not to
produce more scientists but to provide for a
scientifically literate citizenry. The public knew
this even if the science and science education
communities were not so sure; after all, argued
Yager (1983, p. 652-3) “since the advent of the…
‘new’ courses as structured by the science
community, enrollments have dropped by more
than 50%.” The science curriculum alternatives of
the 1980s would be a significant step away from
discipline-focused science education reforms of
the 1960s. They were not however a step away
from instrumentalism. Indeed, the very notion of
science for public use – “what works” – reinforced
an instrumentalist perspective of science.
The reaction to this “flight from science”
(Kromhout & Good, 1983, p. 648) came quickly.
Critics argued that “as motivation for a coherent
study of fundamental science” (p. 647) social
issues and the like were fine. Fundamental science
education, however, could not be effectively
organized by such issues and concerns. Moreover,
the critics were suspicious that alternatively
oriented science curricula could too easily be
hijacked by “antiscientific factions and social
activists” (p. 647). The critics aligned themselves
with C. P. Snow (1964, p. 10), who was sure that it
4

is the scientists who have “the future in their bones"
and to scientists we must look.2
By the end of the 1980s, however, it was
unmistakable that a broader cultural paradigm
shift begun in the 1960s had taken place – and
there would be no going back to the disciplineoriented school science curricula, either in the
inductivist-realist mode of the 1950s or the
positivist-instrumentalist mode of the 1960s. In
the 1960s, there were four watershed cultural
events in the United States that had worldwide
reverberations and set the context for our
discussion about science and epistemology at the
onset of the 21st century. Thomas Kuhn (19221996)3, who in 1962 published, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, precipitated the first4 of
these watershed cultural events. Kuhn advanced
an historical approach to the philosophy of science
and his book was an instant commercial success
that achieved far-reaching influence (Loving &
Cobern, 2000). It was a book born of its period
and had the unintended effect of undermining
scientific privilege by undermining scientific
claims to realism and universal validity.
The second watershed cultural event was
the American Civil Rights Movement. The 1960s
found a nation increasingly concerned about social
progress. The youth culture – or youth
counterculture – of the 1960s was acutely troubled
by oppressive social practices and the gap between
American democratic ideals and actual practice.
Nor was science deemed to have much value for
the cause. A 1960s popular song referred to the
decade as the “Eve of Destruction” (McGuire,
1969), a decade of racial and ethnic hatred.
Science might take us to space but science can’t
help us at home: “you may leave here for four
days in space/ but when you return it’s the same
old place” (McGuire, 1969). The answers were in
legislative and judicial action, and in a rising
acceptance of cultural pluralism. The Civil Rights
movement, Black Power and Afrocentrism
advocates raised American cultural awareness
(later followed by advocates for Feminist,
2

One indication that the critics failed in their efforts is that the Kromhout &
Good title reappears thirteen years later in Gross, Levitt, & Lewis (1996).
Indeed, in the eyes of many in science, the situation had only worsened as
indicated by the two-word addition in the Gross et al title, The Flight From
Science and Reason.
3
See <http://www.emory.edu/EDUCATION/mfp/Kuhnsnap.html> for a
brief biographical sketch of Kuhn’s life and work.
4
We are not indicating a chronological order. For the most part, these were
simultaneous events during the decade.
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Hispanic, and American Indian awareness).
Whereas American society was once thought of as
a “melting pot” (Crouch, 1995; Glazer &
Moynihan, 1979) needing to be more inclusive,
the particularities of culture were becoming more
valued; Americans were becoming more culturally
aware and accepting of American cultural
pluralism.
As with the first watershed cultural event,
the third event was precipitated by a book. Rachel
Carson (1907-1964)5 was a science writer and
ecologist. During the Depression she worked for
the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries writing radio scripts,
and for the Baltimore Sun writing articles on
natural history. She eventually became Editor-inChief of all publications for the U. S. Fish and
Wildlife Service. However, after the end of World
War II, “disturbed by the profligate use of
synthetic chemical pesticides… Carson reluctantly
changed her focus in order to warn the public
about the long term effects of misusing pesticides”
(Lear, 1998). She challenged the agricultural
practices advocated by both government officials
and scientists. In 1962, her book, Silent Spring,
was serialized in the New Yorker and criticism was
not long in coming – and from all quarters.
Carson was violently assailed by threats of
lawsuits and derision, including
suggestions that this meticulous scientist
was a ‘hysterical woman’ unqualified to
write such a book. A huge counterattack
was organized and led by Monsanto,
Velsicol, American Cyanamid – indeed,
the whole chemical industry – duly
supported by the Agriculture Department
as well as the more cautious in the media.
(Matthiessen, 2001)
The force of her arguments and the elegance of
her prose, however, could not be resisted. The
Audubon and National Parks Magazine published
further excerpts from Silent Spring, which rapidly
was becoming a runaway best seller. Rachel
Carson opened eyes to a new revelation: products
of scientific knowledge contribute to
environmental degradation and pose hazards for
public health. The net effect was a certain loss of
scientific innocence. Science may have enabled us

to win World War II and greatly contributed to the
economic expansion of the 1950s, but now science
was discovered to have a darker side.
The fourth watershed cultural event was
the Vietnam War. The decade of the 1960s was a
time of breaking with established norms and
questioning established verities. The Civil Rights
Movement brought about a great moral correction
in American society and politics. The Vietnam
War not only amplified the cultural dissonance of
the 1960s, it turned dissonance into tragedy.
Television brought the war home and people saw
for the first time the effects of Napalm, Agent
Orange and other products of scientific knowledge
in the service of political and military needs.
Students in particular were prone to change their
estimation of science because of what they
perceived as an unholy alliance between the
community of science and a military-industrial
complex that developed and produced weapons.
The rhetoric of values neutrality and objectivity
was not tenable when the science community
having taken credit for such things as the Green
Revolution now denied any responsibility for
Agent Orange and Napalm. Science not only lost
its luster, it lost its innocence. Or, as in the words
of Roger McGuinn of the Byrds (Byrds, 1965):
and I opened my heart to the whole universe/
and I found it was loving/
and I saw the great blunder my teachers had
made
scientific delirium madness
These watershed events set the stage for a
significant philosophical development within
education during the 1990s; what was unthinkable
amongst educators during the 1950s was quite
logical by 1990: anti-realism was believable. The
shift to anti-realism began with concepts of
psychological anti-realism in the early 1990s that
evolved into concepts of cultural anti-realism in
the late 1990s. The early 1990s phase of antirealism was dominated by radical constructivism;
but a psyche-centered radical constructivism later
gave way to social-centered forms of
constructivism (social constructivism) and
ultimately to philosophical multiculturalism.6

5

See RachelCarson.org (“a website devoted to the life and legacy of Rachel
Carson”) at: http://www.rachelcarson.org/.

6

For a discussion on types of multiculturalism, see: Haack (1998, Ch. 8).
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The Insignificance of Reality
Thomas Kuhn’s magnum opus, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions (1962) belongs to a small
but elite group of enduring handbooks of human
culture that transcend categories of specified
knowledge to challenge traditional ideas and
heighten the quest for universal knowledge. Most
of the work in philosophy of science after 1962,
when The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was
first published, was directly or indirectly in
response to Kuhn. Imre Lakatos, Larry Laudan,
Dudley Shapere, Stephen Toulmin, Paul
Feyerabend, David Bloor, Barry Barnes, Bruno
Latour and David Hull are some of the names
associated with the last thirty-five years of
discussion and debate with Kuhn on the nature of
science.7 What has been particularly intriguing is
the use of Kuhn’s work in other disciplines. There
appears to be a wide-ranging appropriation of his
ideas about science to fields ranging from law to
linguistics. Those who appropriate Kuhn’s work
find in him an invitation to rebel from tradition –
the thrill of revisionism. Although Kuhn did not
set out to promote such rebellion – his influence
on revisionists appears enormous; “sociologists,
political scientists, economists, policy specialists,
geographers, anthropologists and marketers have
pounced with glee on the theories of the historical
school, in part because they find non-positivist
approaches to the structure of science appealing
and refreshing” (Donovan, Laudan & Laudan
1988, p. 7; also see Loving & Cobern, 2000).
Kuhn’s concepts of “paradigm” and
“incommensurability” were (mis)taken as
signaling the passing of science’s privileged
claims to epistemic realism and universal validity.
By the 1980s, the unthinkable was now scholarly.
Collins (1981, p. 3) could tell us that the “natural
world has a small or non-existent role in the
construction of scientific knowledge.” According
to Gergen (1988, p. 37), “the validity of
theoretical propositions in the science is in no way
affected by factual evidence...” Of course,
scientific realism was still defended by some as
the only credible way to account for the
instrumental reliability and efficacy of science
(Boyd, 1983); but Aronowitz (1988, p. 204) –
amongst others – countered that, “science
legitimates itself by linking its discoveries to
7
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power... a connection which determines (not
merely influences) what counts as reliable
knowledge.” In education, Ernst von Glasersfeld
(1989) argued that faith in the objectivity of
knowledge, particularly of scientific knowledge,
was misplaced. The difficulties confronting the
possibility of objective knowledge, he wrote, were
“brought to the awareness of a wider public by the
publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. There, undisguised and for everyone
to read, was the explicit statement that”
(Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 121):
…research in parts of philosophy,
psychology, linguistics, and even art
history, all converge to suggest that the
traditional epistemological paradigm is
somehow askew. That failure to fit is also
made increasingly apparent by the
historical study of science… None of these
crisis-promoting subjects has yet produced
a viable alternate to the traditional
epistemological paradigm… (Kuhn 1970,
p. 121)
Glasersfeld, however, was there to supply the
“viable alternate”: radical constructivism.
We noted earlier that for most people
philosophy is an esoteric, arcane discipline with
little apparent practical value. There are however,
moments when philosophy captures widespread
attention. Such an occasion was the opening night
of the 1990 annual meeting of the National
Association for Research in Science Teaching.
Ernst von Glasersfeld gave a highly stimulating
lecture on radical constructivism. The concept was
so well received in the science education
community that a year later, Good (1991)
remarked that most science education researchers
had boarded the “constructivist express;” he
asked, “is constructivism the new religion in
science education?”
Constructivism refers to a view of learning
derived from Piaget's concepts of assimilation and
adaptation, a view further developed in Ausubel
and Novak's work on meaningful learning. As
such, this view of constructivism can be
appropriately termed, pedagogical constructivism,
or as Glasersfeld (1988, p. 8) rather pejoratively
prefers, “trivial constructivism.” The heart of
Glasersfeld's position, however, and what was new
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for many science educators in 1991, was the
linkage of pedagogical constructivism with radical
constructivism. The latter is an epistemological
(nature of justification) and ontological (nature of
truth worthiness) philosophy that divorces
knowing from any notion that reality is the
referent of knowledge or that knowledge exists
beyond one’s individual construction. According
to Glasersfeld (1989a, p. 122) the philosophy of
radical constructivism,
discards the notion that knowledge could
or should be a representation of an
observer-independent world-in-itself and
replaces it with the demand that the
conceptual constructs we call knowledge
be viable in the experiential world of the
knowing subject.
Interpretations of experience are all that one can
know (an old empiricist argument, Matthews
(1994) reminds us. one accepts the validity of
interpretations in so far as they are pragmatically
viable. The appeal of this position is that it renders
moot an historical paradox in Western philosophy.
Radical Constructivism was conceived as
an attempt to circumvent the paradox of
traditional epistemology that springs from
a perennial assumption that is inextricably
knitted into Western philosophy: the
assumption that knowledge may be called
"true" only if it can be considered a more
or less accurate representation of a world
that exists ‘in itself’, prior to and
independent of the knower's experience of
it. The paradox arises, because the works
of philosophers by and large imply, if not
explicitly claim, that they embody a path
towards Truth and True representations of
the world, yet none of them has been able
to provide a feasible test for the accuracy
of such representations. (Glasersfeld,
1989b, p.2)
Glasersfeld argues that in fact the ideas of radical
constructivism can be traced to Copernicus in the
16th century. Glasersfeld quotes Andreas Osiander’s
preface in the original publication of De
Revolutionibus. Osiander wrote that the
repercussions of Copernicus’ work should not be

feared because the works of astronomers are not to
be regarded as truth, but only efficient calculating
devices (Glasersfeld, 1989b, p. 3). Glasersfeld
summarizes the radical constructivist position by
paraphrasing an early 18th century philosopher,
Giambattista Vico:
God alone can know the real world,
because He knows how and of what He has
created it. In contrast, the human knower
can know only what the human knower has
constructed. (1989a, p. 123)
To say the least, this is an ironic application of the
“God of the gaps” argument; but that is acceptable
in radical constructivism given its presupposition
of instrumentalism: “Cognition’s purpose is to
serve the individual’s organization of his or her
experiential world; cognition’s purpose is not the
discovery of an objective ontological reality”
(Staver, 1998, p. 504)
Both Glasersfeld’s epistemology and his
ontology were clearly relativistic, but he retained
the traditional focus of philosophy on the
individual. His was a psyche-centered view of
constructivism. The publication of Thomas
Kuhn’s 1962 book, The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, however, which was so critical to the
acceptance of radical constructivism, was only the
first of four 1960s watershed events. Very quickly,
Glasersfeld’s radical constructivist ideas
precipitated by Kuhn’s book were themselves
influenced by ideas spawned by the other three
watershed events that continue to percolate
through Western intellectual culture. By 1997,
Geelan was able to identify six thoroughly
established forms of constructivist theory, only
one of which was Glasersfeld’s original radical
constructivism. Amongst education researchers,
there was a clear shift to social variants of
constructivism, that is, to social constructivism.
A World of Multiple Realities
The American Civil Rights movement of the
1960s brought about an increased awareness of
culture and that indeed America was a culturally
plural society. Moreover, increasing economic and
cultural globalization brings about greater cultural
awareness (Reiff, 1993).
7
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Increasingly, the world's inhabitants are
living in close proximity to and
interspersed among people of different
ethnic and national backgrounds, and
frequently at some distance from the land
of their birth. (Fox-Genevese, 1999, p.
531-539)
Instead of the “melting pot,” people began to use
different metaphors, the “tossed salad,” or the “jar
of jelly beans.” Culturally isolated or insolated it
is much easier to maintain that one’s own ideas
are the correct ideas; confronted with others – with
cultural contamination by those who are alien – it
becomes much more difficult to maintain that
one’s ideas are the sole correct ideas and that the
ideas of others are incorrect. Hence, cultural
awareness can introduce cultural doubt, which in
Western societies quickly spread to doubts about
science.
Prior to 1960, science had been firmly
bolted to epistemological confidence. By 1990,
those bolts had been weakened, if not sheared. In
the past, science would have been resistant to the
infection of cultural doubt. A building on a solid
foundation can resist an earthquake. If that first
quake, however, damages the foundation, the
building may not emerge unscathed from a second
quake. Science withstood the earthquakes brought
about by Kuhn, Viet Nam, and Silent Spring but
its foundation was badly damaged. We have
already discussed the Kuhnian effect. The
Structure of Scientific Revolutions damaged
science’s epistemological foundation. Vietnam
and Silent Spring damaged science’s moral
foundation. It was bad enough to have the vivid
TV images of Napalm right in one’s own living
room. It was worse to learn of the disastrous
unintended consequences of putative humanitarian
science, such as the development of pesticides.
Silent Spring created a nervous awareness
that science and technology, followed
blindly, could destroy life even when
intended for beneficial non-military
applications. It showed that scientists,
narrow-mindedly pursuing profits, often
acted ignorantly and implied that the
narrowly focused specializations of
modern science could have dangerous
consequences. (Friberg, 2000, p. 50)
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Add in Bhopal, the Challenger, Chernobyl, and
Three Mile Island and it is no wonder that the
reputation of science has suffered in the public
square – a situation only worsened by the fact that
the public makes little distinction between the
aims, methods and theories of good science and
the use – or abuse – of scientific findings for profit
or power motives.
The critical point is that the cultural
foundation on which science rests was weakened
at the very moment in time when a plethora of
competitors and challengers appeared. With the
rise of cultural pluralism, people are far more
inclined to take alien ideas seriously – ideas that
heretofore would have been called ethnoscience
and folklore, pseudoscience, and even quackery.
With regard to Eastern concepts from Buddhism
and Hinduism, popular articles and books, such as
Fritjof Capra’s The Tao of Physics, “worked to
confer the prestige of modern science on Asian
mystical traditions, already highly regarded for
their sophistication and beauty, directing openminded intellectual attention their way” (Friberg,
2000, p. 50). This Eastern influence is particularly
notable in health care where “alternative
medicine” is very much in vogue (see for
example: Lyons, 2001; Rosenblatt, 2001; TIME,
2001).
The response in education to these cultural
developments has been “multiculturalism
curriculum reform” (Sleeter & Grant, 1987).
Borrowing Haack’s (1998) analysis, educational
reform began with pluralistic educational
multiculturalism: “it is especially desirable in
multicultural societies… for students to know
something about the cultures of others with whom
they live” (Haack, 1998, p 137). This curriculum
perspective is clearly presented in the original
edition of Gollnick & Chinn’s, Multicultural
education in a pluralistic society:
Multicultural education is an educational
concept that addresses cultural diversity
and the provision of equal educational
opportunity in schools. For it to become a
reality in the formal school situation, the
typical environment must reflect a
commitment to multicultural education.
The cultural backgrounds of students are as
important in developing effective

In Defense of Realism

instructional strategies as their physical
and mental capabilities. Educators need to
understand the cultural strengths brought
to class by students from diverse cultural
backgrounds and use those cultural
advantages to develop effective
instructional strategies. (Gollnick & Chinn,
1986, p. 29-30)
Moreover, the importance of understanding “the
cultural strengths brought to class by students
from diverse cultural backgrounds” is said to be
particularly critical in science education given that
not all students within this diversity have achieved
equally well. According to Luft (1998, p. 103):
As classrooms become increasingly
diverse, several researchers report that
science instruction does not provide
students with opportunities to do science,
science instruction is not relevant to
students’ lives, and science instruction
does not result in equitable achievement
for students on science assignments…
Although the relationship between doing
science, the relevancy of science, or
science achievement and ethnicity is not
clear, African-American, Hispanic, and
Native American students score lower than
their white and Asian counterparts on
science literacy assessments.
To remedy the uneven science achievement across
cultural groups, educators have embraced
pluralistic educational multiculturalism
approaches that bring cultural diversity to the
curriculum itself. The Portland African-American
Baseline Essays (Adams, 1986) are one high
profile, and controversial (e.g., Shanker, 1992;
Loving & Montellano, 2000; Ortiz de Montellano,
1996), example of curriculum innovation in this
vein: “Students’ and staffs’ lack of knowledge
about ethnic groups spurred Portland schools to
begin compiling ‘baseline essays’ about the
contributions of six major geocultural groups”
(O’Neil, 1991/1992, p. 24). Atwater (1994 &
1995) offers a more temperate perspective on
multicultural science education, and indeed the
literature during the 1990s is replete with culture
and gender-oriented science lessons and activities.
See Luft (1998) for a more recent review.

For other educators and families,
multiculturalism is taken even further and
construed as particularistic educational
multiculturalism: “that students… should be
educated in their own culture” (Haack, 1998, p.
137). For example, a major publisher of Christianoriented k-12 textbooks proclaims:
At A Beka Book, we are unashamedly
Christian and traditional in our approach to
education. Because of this, we have often
had to go against the tide of the academic
establishment in order to meet the highest
standards of Christian scholarship.
(http://www.abeka.com/ABB/Catalogs/AboutABB/
AboutFrames.html)
The explosive growth of the home schooling
movement over the last 15 years provides
dramatic evidence for the interest in culturally
situated education (see, McDowell & Ray, 2000)
that Haack (1998) would describe as particularistic
educational multiculturalism
Science education of the 1990s, with its
emphasis on personal, social, and cultural
relevance, meshed very well with these rapidly
developing multicultural ideas. At the end of the
decade, the dean of American science education,
Paul DeHart Hurd (2000) wrote:
The current science education reform
movement in the United States has been
underway since 1970. From the beginning,
there has been broad agreement that the
traditional goals of science education are
obsolete and that new curricula need to be
“invented” (p 282)…. A central theme for
reinventing science curricula is to put
science into service for individuals and for
society. (p. 285)
This instrumentalist, utilitarian attitude easily
fused with the now pervasive cultural awareness
of difference. Salted by tacitly felt, growing
doubts over Western scientific practices,
accomplishments and attitudes, the fusion has
yielded philosophical multiculturalism (Haack,
1998): all knowledge is local and culturally
situated. Thus, there are “multiple realities”
(Denzin & Lincoln, 1994, p. 14) – the world is lots
of ways because people have lots of ways of
9
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constructing it. There is no “preexisting reality
‘out there’” to be discovered (Strauss & Corbin,
1994, 279). Rather,
Realities are apprehendable in the form of
multiple, intangible mental constructions,
socially and experientially based, local and
specific in nature... and dependent for their
form and content on the individual persons
or groups holding the constructions.
Constructions are not more or less “true,”
in any absolute sense, but simply more or
less informed and/or sophisticated.
Constructions are alterable, as are their
associated “realities.” (Guba & Lincoln,
1994, p. 110-111)
Rather than viewing truth as the fit
between sense impressions and the real
world, for a constructivist it is the fit of our
sense impressions with our conceptions:
the authority for truth lies with each of us.
(Driver & Bell, 1986, p. 452).
Furthermore, according to this relativist
philosophy, if the “authority for truth lies with
each of us” then it clearly makes sense that one
would speak of Western science rather than
simply, science. The name of a knowledge domain
is properly preceded by a culturally identifying
adjective as in Eastern religion, Turkish history, or
African philosophy. One might speak of
masculine knowledge or feminine knowledge, but
not simply knowledge as if knowledge were
somehow universal, being grounded in a physical
reality common to all. Rather, being culturally
situated, no particular knowledge domain can be
privileged vis-à-vis other cultural situations. The
logical next step from this elevation of culture to
its place as artist and arbiter of knowledge is that
all knowledge is local; “what is taken to be
universal, value-free truths is actually situated
knowledge” (Brickhouse, 2001, p. 282).
The first step toward culturally situated
knowledge is the rejection of epistemological
universalism. The rejection of epistemological
universalism is grounded in an
instrumentalist/utilitarian rejection of
epistemological realism. Our view is that the
rejection of scientific universalism and scientific
realism by multiculturalists has been altogether
10

much too facile – marked by a lack of attention to
the logical implications of their contentions – and
altogether unnecessary for the purposes of
achieving equitable science education for diverse
learners. In a previous article we made the
argument for scientific universalism (Cobern &
Loving, 2001; see Cobern, 1991; Loving, 1997;
Siegel, 2001, Southerland, 2000). We now turn
our attention to a commonsense view of realism.
A Metaphysical Choice
Understanding how people come to the rejection
of scientific realism, does not endorse such a
decision. To the contrary, it is our position that
most rejections of realism amongst educators and
educational researchers are simply naive and
ultimately will not serve the needs of students with
regard to an education in the sciences.
Philosophical defenses of realism abound (e.g.,
Khlentzos, 2000; Matthews, 1994; Phillips, 2000,
Sankey, 2001) and it is not our intention to repeat
those defenses here. It is important to note that the
defenses argued in the science education literature
(e.g., Slezak, 1994 a&b; Suchting, 1992 & 1995),
we believe, are rather ineffective – not for lack of
philosophical depth or rhetorical skill, but for a
lack of cultural acumen – particularly with respect
to teachers. Our approach is a commonsense
approach that first acknowledges watershed
cultural events and the impact they have had on
the public understanding of epistemology. Second,
we suggest an alternative: culturally informed,
critical realism. We must begin however, by
drawing attention to what it would mean if we did
indeed believe that knowledge was socially
constructed, substantially unrelated to the true
nature of the world in which we live.
We begin by first noting that too often
opponents of relativism over-philosophize; they
drown their intended audience in what many
readers consider irrelevant pedantry. Eflin,
Glennan, and Reisch (1999, p. 114) are led to
suggest that, “philosophical debates about realism
should be avoided… These debates are often
Byzantine and confusing even to those of us who
work in them.” On the other hand, supporters of
relativistic ideas, tend either to adopt a “taken for
granted that this is obviously true” attitude toward
anti-realism; or, they obfuscate the critical issues
by adopting a strained writing style littered with
the unique use of otherwise ordinary words. In this
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latter group fall the very postmodernists,
poststructuralists, and postcolonialists who
accepted for publication, Transgressing The
Boundaries: Towards A Transformative
Hermeneutics Of Quantum Gravity, which is of
course the gobbly-gook article by physicist Alan
Sokal (1996) who later revealed it as a hoax. The
problem is that technical language taken to an
extreme becomes a convoluted, hyper-obscurantist
The Critical Realist

private text that is, as Shakespeare wrote, full of
sound and fury signifying nothing. Our intention is
to present the critical arguments in common sense
terms. Our method, reminiscent of Laudan’s fourway discussion in Science and Relativism (1990,
is a fictitious interrogation of a Philosophical
Multiculturalist by a Critical Realist. The
interrogation begins with the Critical Realist
asking, “What is knowledge?”

The Philosophical Multiculturalist

CR: What is knowledge?
PM: Knowledge is a coherent system of thought. Coherence
involves conceptual coherence and instrumental accuracy. If
our theories are conceptually coherent and instrumentally
accurate, we may regard them as valid – some may take
“valid” to mean “truthful.”
CR: Does such coherence speak to the true nature of reality?
PM: No. Reality is impenetrably shrouded. We have only
our perceptions and the concepts we build upon those
perceptions.
CR: Then how can one intelligently choose between
competing theories or ideas built upon our perceptions?
PM: The theories that show the greatest conceptual
coherence and instrumental accuracy are the ones we choose
as the most valid.
CR: Ok, but we know that theories are revised, changed and
discarded from time to time. How do you account for theory
change?
PM: A theory can change based on conceptual changes
concerning the same data where new conceptualizations of
existing data result in greater coherence – consider the
example of Copernicus rethinking the data on which the
Ptolemaic system was based. And, there can be perceptual
changes (e.g., new data) that lead to theory change. Consider
the example of Kepler working with the massive
observational data collected by Tycho Brahe.
CR: Are we talking about perceptual and experiential
changes with regard to a real world?
11
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PM: Yes, of course. I’m no Berkeleyan idealist!

CR: Well good. So, would you not agree that perception is
the perception of something?
PM: Agreed, but as I said, what that something really is, is
impenetrably shrouded. It is our thoughts – locally
influenced – that we project as reality.

CR: Perhaps but would you not agree that although one’s
perceptions are strongly influenced by conceptual structure
– locally influenced as you say – perception is not wholly
determined by our conceptual structures? Otherwise there
would be no difference between a perception and an
hallucination.
PM: First, it is not my contention that conceptual structures
are completely determined by local influences. Second, an
hallucination has little chance of leading to instrumentally
accurate theory; so whether one can distinguish between an
hallucination and perception is irrelevant.
CR: Well then, it seems that instrumental accuracy is quite
critical to your argument. And, if you are agreeing that that
conceptual structures are not completely determined by local
influences, then it seems to me that no matter how
inaccurate a perception may be, it still must contain
something of reality if there is any instrumental accuracy at
all.
PM: Perhaps but we can’t know that to be true simply
because we have no direct access to reality – I repeat: reality
is impenetrably shrouded.
CR: Let’s try a thought experiment. Could a conceptually
coherent system that is totally imaginative be instrumentally
accurate?
PM: Of course. The history of science provides many
examples of serendipitous insight that leads to scientific
advancement. Consider the example of Friedrich August
Kekulé who worked out the ring-structure of benzene based
on a dream he had!
CR: Could a totally imaginative, but coherent system that
predicts experiences that never occur, be of any value in
science?
PM: No
12
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CR: In fact, for a system to be considered coherent it is
important for that system to be instrumentally accurate. Isn’t
that so?
PM: Agreed
CR: Would you also agree that theory improvement means
that a theory is made instrumentally more accurate and
conceptually more coherent?
PM: Agreed
CR: Well then, could a speculative, coherent conceptual
system that is (of course unbeknownst to us) in total
ontological error, be instrumentally accurate and reliable?
PM: Anything is possible but I suppose such an occurrence
would not be likely. Any accurate predictions would be
quite fortuitous.
CR: Would you then also agree that any changes to this
speculative, coherent conceptual system that moved it even
further into ontological error, would only decrease its
instrumental power?
PM: Again anything is possible but I think your statement is
likely to be correct.
CR: Then consider this question: could instrumental power
ever be increased in a situation where conceptual changes to
the system moved the system further from ontological
reality?
PM: It is unlikely.
CR: And consider this question: could instrumental power
be improved by increasing conceptual coherence that in fact
moves the system toward ontological reality?
PM: Yes, but you can’t know that in fact this is happening.
CR: But, you agreed that we are talking about perceptual
and experiential changes with regard to a real world, and
that perception is the perception of something. And, you
agreed that one’s perceptions though strongly influenced by
conceptual structure, are not completely determined.
PM: Yes, I agreed.

13
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CR: Surely, we must them be able to say that perceptual and
experiential experience are significantly grounded in
ontological reality even when perceptual and experiential
experience is suffused with error.

PM: I see where you are headed and I am not sure that I am
willing to say that perceptual and experiential experience are
significantly grounded in ontological reality.

CR: Then we have arrived at a metaphysical choice! It is
true that we cannot know with certainty that perceptual and
experiential experiences are significantly grounded in
ontological reality. It is equally true, however, that we
cannot know for certain that perceptual and experiential
experiences are not significantly grounded in ontological
reality.
I submit that nothing in human experience nor common
sense suggests that it is better to accept that latter over the
former.
PM: Go on.
CR: Then we surely can also agree that theory change that
more sharply and accurately focuses a system on ontological
reality will improve instrumental power and will itself be
more conceptually coherent.
PM: Agreed, but I still must insist that you can’t know that
in fact this is happening.
CR: You can, given the nature of perception and
experience. In so far as we reject the claim that the efficacy
of a coherent system is totally independent of any
ontological reality, the efficacy of a coherent system is at
least partially dependent on ontological reality. Therefore,
knowledge that increases conceptual coherence and
instrumental power is knowledge that more accurately
corresponds with reality. There is simply no other rational
way to account for human ability to increase instrumental
power other than that our knowledge has the characteristics
of verisimilitude vis-à-vis the real world.
PM: Sigh….

Realism Reconsidered: Dürer Vs Kandinsky
The Critical Realist drives home the point that
there is simply no other rational way to account
for human ability to increase instrumental power
other than that knowledge has the characteristics
of verisimilitude vis-à-vis the real world. This is
realism, that:
14

the world is as it is independently of how
humans take it to be. The objects the world
contains, together with their properties and
the relations they enter into, fix the world’s
nature and these objects exist
independently of our ability to discover
they do. Unless this is so, realists argue,
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none of our beliefs about our world could
be objectively true since true beliefs tell us
how things are and beliefs are objective
when true or false independently of what
anyone might think…. Nonetheless,
realism is controversial. (Khlentzos, 2000)
This controversy – the assertion, as made by the
Philosophical Multiculturalist, that objective
knowledge about a real world is unobtainable – is
an old one. Mortimer Adler noted that the question
of how ideas can actually represent knowledge of
an objective reality underlines all the unresolved
“riddles and perplexities of later empiricism”
(1974, p. x). The 18th century Scottish philosopher
Thomas Reid, however, resolved this controversy
in a way that many teachers of science today will
find quite compelling. Reid was one of the
founders of the “common sense” school of
philosophy, or what Haack (1998, p. 156) calls
“critical common-sensism.”
What this means is that Reid is not
concerned to answer certain questions of
justification that can seem enormously
pressing to us in certain philosophical
moods. He is not, for instance, interested in
providing a justification for our belief in
the external world by appeal to first
principles of some sort. For instance, Reid
feels he can refute skeptical hypotheses –
such as Descartes’s hypothesis of an evil
demon who makes us believe that the
world is the way we take it to be when it is
really vastly different – simply by showing
that such a hypothesis is no more likely to
be true than the common-sensical belief
that the world is much the way we perceive
it to be. Since the belief in the external
world is a dictate of common sense, it is,
Reid thinks, as justified as it needs to be
when it is shown to be on the same footing
as any alternative. Justification, therefore,
does not necessarily require providing
positive reasons in favor of commonsensical beliefs; common sense beliefs
could be adequately justified simply by
undermining the force of the reasons in
favor of alternatives to common sense.
(Yaffe, 2000).

We can apply this view of alternatives to the
“metaphysical choice” in the dialogue between the
Critical Realist and the Philosophical
Multiculturalist. The Critical Realist asserts:
Then we have arrived at a metaphysical
choice! It is true that we cannot know with
certainty that perceptual and experiential
experiences are significantly grounded in
ontological reality. However, it is equally
true that we cannot know for certain that
perceptual and experiential experiences are
not significantly grounded in ontological
reality.
Reid’s response would be that without very strong
reason indeed, one should not reject that which
human experience and common sense suggests is
true.
This is not to deny that this position has
difficulties and certainly the proponents of realism
do not hold the unreflective position opponents of
realism in education seem to think that they do.
The purported difficulties for realism such as
changes in science over time and the differences
amongst cultures have long been recognized.
Realists have always recognized that knowledge
changes and develops. The realist recognizes that
knowledge at any given time only approximates
reality and that the quest for accuracy is endless.
The realist understands that an individual constructs
knowledge of reality from sense perceptions and
from conjectural theories, which are subject to many
influences. Knowledge is fallible (Pierce, 1931).
What is the cause of fallibility? In the past one
would most likely cite the inherent limitations of
experimental efforts and intellectual acumen; and
of course the limited nature of the scientific
knowledge base at any one time. In other words
our best current efforts are limited by the lack of
experimental and intellectual perfection. What has
changed in light of cultural, historical and
philosophical studies is that in addition to these
internal limitations we now recognize a new range
of external limitations: metaphysics, cultural
factors, predispositions, prejudice, power
relationships, politics, ideology and economics.
Hence, the realist is not naive, but critical
(Polkinghorne 1991). Knowledge of reality is not
15
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immediately by impact. (Bell, 1976, p.110,
112)

like a photograph, but more like representational art.
In a Dürer painting, for example:
there is little of sensuous beauty; but the
rude, stark outlines of life itself, the literalminded dwelling on the last detail of the
imaginative vision, the intense seriousness
of the preoccupation with the furniture of
practical life, whether in the creased strength
of those faces of his merchant friends – “I
think the more exact and like a man a
picture is the better the work,” he said ...
(Randall, 1940, p. 127)
Representational art and photographs, however,
are not easily confused. The vicissitude of
knowledge is widely recognized in
representational art. The goal may be exactitude,
but the goal is ever elusive. Too often opponents
of realism take realism to be an “either/or” sort of
thing; either we know the real world without error,
or we cannot know the real world at all. But there
is a more nuanced view of realism, a critical
realism, that, “recognizes that there is always
some element of construction in knowledge, but
maintains the common sense view that the world
external to or prior to our thought places limits on
what can count as knowledge” (Lillegard, 2001).
It would seem that those who embrace nonrealism have grown tired of the quest to know
reality and thus declare reality unimportant. It is
only the construction, in and of itself, that is
important. To carry further the artistic metaphor,
radically, culturally, or socially constructed
knowledge is a form of aesthetic modernism as one
finds in modern art:
Modernism ... denies the primacy of an
outside reality, as given. It seeks either to
rearrange that reality, or to retreat to the
self's interior, to private experience as the
source of its concerns and aesthetic
preoccupations ... There is an emphasis on
the self as touchstone of understanding and
on the activity of the knower rather than the
character of the object as the source of
knowledge ... Thus one discerns the
intentions of modern painting ... to break up
ordered space ... to bridge the distance
between object and spectator, to “thrust”
itself on the viewer and establish itself
16

As with a Wassily Kandinsky painting, there is no
intention to represent the natural world. The value
of the art is in its impact. The value of locally
constructed knowledge is also in its impact, but in
science that impact is instrumental accuracy. One
does not worry that knowledge match reality; only
that knowledge allows the useful prediction of
experience, its impact. But what metaphysic does
instrumental accuracy reinforce? The eminent
physicist Cecil Frank Powell noted, “all our
experience of the development of science suggests
that there is indeed an order in nature which we
can discover...” (1972, p. 5). We go even further
and assert that instrumental accuracy – whether in
the form of Traditional Ecological Knowledge8
amongst First Nations people of Canada or quantum
physics from the Fermi Lab – reinforces the
estimation that knowledge is approaching reality,
and in fact undermines the radical notion of
philosophical multiculturalism.
The concepts of realism and universalism
in science are often perceived as threatening to
other ways of knowing, particularly indigenous
and traditional ways of knowing. This perception
is not without warrant (see Ladriere, 1977). As
European contact with peoples from far away
places increased, European “perceptions of the
material superiority of their own cultures,
particularly as manifested in scientific thought and
technological innovation, shaped their attitudes
toward and interaction with peoples they
encountered overseas” (Adas, 1989, p. 4). Why?
Adas goes on to explain.
In the late eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries, most European thinkers
concluded that the unprecedented control
over nature made possible by Western
science and technology proved that
European modes of thought and social
organization corresponded much more
closely to the underlying realities of the
universe than did those of any other people
or society, past or present. (Adas, 1989, p.
7)
8

For more on Traditional Ecological Knowledge, see Snively & Corsiglia
(2001).
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Western teachers carried this sense of superiority
based on science and technology into the colonial
education system. In a rare moment of honest
reflection, one such teacher admitted: “In common
with so many others, I used to think that we could
get rid of Bantu ‘stupidities’ by suitable talks on
natural science, hygiene, etc., as if the natural
sciences could subvert their traditional lore or
their philosophy” (Tempels, 1959, p. 30). Tempels
recognized resistance to invading ideas and
wondered if the invaders were doing the right
thing. Development theorists through the 1960s
had few such doubts. Economic development
theory was based on displacing traditional beliefs
by modern ones compatible with science and
technology (Rostow, 1971). In 1962, the
prestigious journal Science published an
approving article about movement toward a single
world culture dominated, of course, by science
(Dedijer, 1962).
This type of scientistic idealism explicitly
directed toward the non-western world now seems
far removed, but other forms are alive and well.
Bunge (1996), Dawkins (1986), Gross, Levitt and
Lewis (1996), and Mahner and Bunge (1996)
come readily to mind. Nevertheless, the highoctane rhetoric of an outspoken few should not be
taken as proof that realism and universalism in
science are inherently scientistic beliefs. Nor
should one conclude that the best way to protect
other ways of knowing from the imperialistic
behavior of scientistic true believers is to adopt a
relativistic, instrumental stance toward knowledge.
One should consider, for example, that no First
Nations person thinks of Traditional Ecological
Knowledge (TEK) as instrumental or viable. TEK
exists because it is thought to be true knowledge
about the real world. The concepts of
“instrumentalism” and “viability” are of Western
origin; and to the extent that anti-realism is
promoted based on these ideas, an imperialism is
being practiced that is just as menacing as any of
the 19th century forms. Indeed, realism is the
philosophical domain that invites indigenous
knowledge – actually any proposed knowledge
about the physical world – to bid for respect.
Regardless of its origins, regardless of local
influences, any proposed knowledge that provides
insight on our physical world can gain a hearing,
because realism is literally the common ground we
all share. What realists want are rational or

cognitively constructed warrants for believing
knowledge to be true or to represent reality –
evidence.
Conclusion
It is past time to get over the false claim that
science does not really provide an objective,
universal but approximate description of the real
world – without forgetting that science is
imperfect, incomplete and fallible; and is not the
only source of knowledge that we as humans find
of value. Our contention is that professional
educators have been all altogether too facile in their
rejection of epistemological realism. If time is taken
to carefully examine the logical consequences of
anti-realism, we think that most would agree that
what “works” is knowledge about a real world
shared by all. Moreover, universal scientific realism
is not the cause of the epistemological imperialism
that is so offensive to professional educators and
which drives them to philosophical
multiculturalism. Epistemological imperialism is the
direct consequence of scientism. Attacking realism
is thus wrongheaded; but worse, it is self-defeating.
Attacking realism undercuts the very ground on
which other contributions to knowledge about
Nature can gain a hearing and respect beyond local
borders.
Following Haack (1998), we believe that
science is well deserving of distinction because it
has been such a powerful tool for the accurate
description of Nature and illumination of natural
processes. Privilege is another matter. Science
cannot answer all the questions humans are wont to
ask; thus science can only be privileged within the
boundaries of its purpose. As one noted scientist
remarked: “for all its explanatory powers, science
is very limited in the kind of questions that it can
address well: how things work, problems
amenable to quantification, and deriving general
laws about the properties of matter” (Alexander,
2001). Other fields of study are called upon to
answer and illuminate other questions that humans
have. Different people ask different questions
calling upon various forms of knowledge. It is thus
appropriate that educators promote a pluralistic
view of knowledge: pluralism not relativism,
distinction not privilege.
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